Private Equity Roll-Up Statistics: Returns, Deal Volume, & Failure Data

A private equity roll-up, also called a buy-and-build strategy, is the practice of acquiring multiple smaller companies in the same industry and combining them into a single, larger platform company that exits at a higher valuation multiple than its parts were bought for. It is now the dominant model in American private equity: add-on acquisitions account for 75.9% of all U.S. buyout activity,¹ and buy-and-build deals have produced average IRRs of 31.6% against 23.1% for standalone buyouts.²

This guide compiles the most authoritative publicly available data on roll-up deal volume, returns by deal configuration, multiple arbitrage, capital structure, failure rates, and sector consolidation across insurance, healthcare, home services, and other fragmented industries. The data holds some surprises: most roll-ups fail to meet their synergy targets, platforms above $290M in enterprise value underperform standalone buyouts, and the highest verified returns (15 to 20x for EQT’s Anticimex, 82% IRR for Latticework’s veterinary platform) came from operators who acquired slowly and integrated well. Every precise figure is sourced, with the data year stated in the text.

Key Takeaways

• Add-on transactions represented 75.9% of all U.S. buyout activity in Q2 2025, up from roughly 20% in 2000, with approximately 5,000 bolt-on deals completed per year (PitchBook, BCG/HHL Leipzig).
• Buy-and-build deals generated an average IRR of 31.6% versus 23.1% for standalone buyouts, with multiple expansion contributing 15.3 percentage points of the return (BCG/HHL Leipzig).
• Returns concentrate in restraint and small scale: deals with 1 to 2 add-ons earned 35.5% IRR versus 19.9% for deals with 3 or more, and platforms under $70M in enterprise value earned 52.4% versus 12.5% for platforms above $290M (BCG/HHL Leipzig).
• In the lower middle market, add-ons accounted for over 80% of all deals in 2024, and sub-$10M add-ons now price at a premium to same-size platforms, 5.7x versus 4.5x EBITDA (Cherry Bekaert, GF Data).
• Most roll-ups fail: roughly 60% miss projected synergies within two years, and older research puts the share that create no investor value above two-thirds (Opus Connect, HBR).
• Verified winners are large when they land: EQT’s Anticimex returned an estimated 15 to 20x, Latticework’s American Veterinary Group a confirmed 6.5x MOIC at 82% IRR, and Shore Capital’s realized exits a 5.5x median MOIC at 77% average IRR.
• Accredited investors can invest in roll-up deals through private equity co-investment groups like CapitalPad, with minimums of $25K per deal and fewer than 5% of inbound deals advancing to investors.

Contents

1. What Is a Private Equity Roll-Up
2. Add-On Deal Volume: How Roll-Ups Took Over PE
3. Buy-and-Build Returns: IRR by Deal Configuration
4. Multiple Arbitrage: The Mechanics and the Math
5. The Lower Middle Market Advantage
6. Roll-Up Statistics by Industry
7. Named Roll-Up Deals with Verified Returns
8. Failure Rates: What Kills Roll-Ups
9. How Add-On Acquisitions Are Financed
10. How Investors Access Roll-Up Deals
11. What This Data Tells Investors

What Is a Private Equity Roll-Up

A private equity roll-up (also called a buy-and-build strategy or consolidation play) is a method of acquiring multiple smaller companies in the same industry and combining them into a single, larger platform company. The acquiring firm, typically a PE fund or an independent sponsor, purchases an initial “platform” business, then executes a series of add-on acquisitions to grow the platform’s revenue and EBITDA.

The strategy works because of a structural feature of private markets: smaller companies sell at lower valuation multiples than larger ones. A $1 million EBITDA plumbing company might trade at 3 to 4x EBITDA. A $15 million EBITDA plumbing company, doing the exact same work in the same markets, might command 10 to 12x. The roll-up operator buys cheap, integrates, and exits at the multiple that scale commands. That gap between entry and exit multiples is called multiple arbitrage, and it is the primary return driver in buy-and-build strategies.

Add-On Deal Volume: How Roll-Ups Took Over PE

Add-on transactions represented 75.9% of all U.S. buyout activity in Q2 2025, up 250 basis points year-over-year and 340 bps above the five-year average of 72.5%.¹ That dominance is the endpoint of a two-decade climb.

Year	Add-On Share of PE Deals	Avg. Add-Ons per Deal
2000	20%	1.3
2012	53%	2.7
2022	72% to 77%	—
Q2 2025	75.9%	—

Sources: BCG/HHL Leipzig (2000–2012),² Bain (2022),³ PitchBook via Cherry Bekaert (2025)¹

The absolute volume runs near 5,000 deals per year. PitchBook counted 4,950 U.S. bolt-on acquisitions in 2024 and 4,509 in 2025.⁴

Count vs. value: Despite representing 76% of deal count, add-ons account for only 11% of buyout deal value (2024), down from a peak of 40% in 2015. These are overwhelmingly small transactions, often under $25 million, being bolted onto larger platforms.⁵

The intensity is also increasing within individual deals. Close to 50% of all global add-on deals now represent at least the fourth acquisition by a single platform company, up from 30% in 2019 and 21% in 2003. Serial buy-and-build is the norm.⁶

Europe runs the same playbook at lower intensity. Over 2019 to 2024, 55% of Nordic PE-backed companies carried out add-on acquisitions (averaging 4.7 per asset), compared to 53% in France, 48% in the UK and Ireland, 41% in the DACH region, and 35% in CEE. The all-Europe average is 48% of assets pursuing add-ons with 3.1 add-ons per asset.⁷

Buy-and-Build Returns: IRR by Deal Configuration

The most granular public study on buy-and-build returns comes from BCG and HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, analyzing 121 deals with full return data exited between 1998 and 2012.² Buy-and-build deals generated an average IRR of 31.6%, compared with 23.1% for standalone deals. Multiple expansion contributed 15.3 percentage points to buy-and-build IRR versus 7.5 points for standalone deals. The arbitrage is doing most of the work.

Deal Configuration	Average IRR
Standalone buyout (no add-ons)	23.1%
Buy-and-build, all deals	31.6%
Buy-and-build, 1 to 2 add-ons	35.5%
Buy-and-build, more than 2 add-ons	19.9%
Platform under $70M EV	52.4%
Platform over $290M EV	12.5%
GP with 11+ buy-and-build deals of experience	36.6%
Industry-deepening add-ons (same sector)	43.5%
Diversifying add-ons (different sector)	16.4%

Source: BCG & HHL Leipzig, “The Power of Buy and Build,” European deals exited 1998–2012²

More bolt-on acquisitions per deal is not better. Complexity erodes returns.

One caveat on the table above: the data is old, covering European deals exited 1998 to 2012 with a return sample of 121. It also remains the most granular buy-and-build return analysis available publicly, which is why it still gets cited everywhere.

Revenue growth scales with add-on activity

PE-backed businesses with more than 5 add-on acquisitions achieved a 20.4% five-year revenue CAGR (median), nearly 3x the organic growth rate.⁷

Add-Ons Completed	5-Year Revenue CAGR (Median)
0	7.6%
1 to 3	10.8%
3 to 5	15.9%
More than 5	20.4%

Source: PwC, European PE-backed companies, 2019–2024⁷

Hold the two tables together and the picture sharpens. Heavy acquirers grow revenue fastest, but the 3+ add-on cohort earns the lowest IRRs. Top-line growth through acquisition only pays when integration keeps pace.

Specialist funds outperform generalists

Specialist buyout funds (2010 to 2022 vintages) generated pooled IRRs of 17% versus 13% for generalists, with lower loss ratios (9% versus 12%). Specialists derived 4x more equity value from EBITDA margin expansion (43% of returns versus 10%) and relied far less on multiple expansion (5% of returns versus 35% for generalists).⁸

PE-backed middle market companies also grew employment at 9.0% year-over-year (July 2024 to July 2025) versus 1.2% for the overall U.S. economy. In private-to-private buyouts, the structure behind most lower middle market roll-ups, employment rises 13% over two years post-acquisition.⁹

Multiple Arbitrage: The Mechanics and the Math

Smaller companies trade at lower valuation multiples because they carry more key-person risk and attract fewer buyers at exit. Larger companies trade at higher multiples because institutional buyers compete aggressively for scale. The gap between these two tiers is the arbitrage.

The median EBITDA multiple for buyouts below $100M was 6.4x in 2022, versus 16.9x for mega-deals above $5B, a 10.5-turn gap.¹⁰

How the math works, hypothetically: Consider a sponsor who acquires a platform at 5.5x EBITDA, then completes several add-on acquisitions at 3 to 4x over 3 to 4 years. The blended entry multiple across the combined entity drops to roughly 4x. If the combined company sells at 10 to 12x at exit, the sponsor bought at 4x blended and sold at 12x. That spread, amplified by debt, is the engine of roll-up returns.

A Yale School of Management paper on entry multiples quantified the sensitivity. At a 5x entry with a 7x exit over five years (3% growth), the model produces 19% IRR and 2.2x MOIC. At 7x entry with the same exit, returns collapse to 10% IRR and 1.5x MOIC.¹¹ Entry price discipline matters more than almost anything else a buyer controls.

The Lower Middle Market Advantage

In the lower middle market, add-on acquisitions accounted for over 80% of all deals in 2024, against roughly 73% across the whole market.¹² Four out of five LMM PE deals are roll-ups.

The size threshold: Small platforms (under $70M enterprise value) in buy-and-build deals generated an average IRR of 52.4%, versus 20.3% for small standalone deals. Large platforms (above $290M) underperformed standalone deals: 12.5% versus 16.2%. Buy-and-build works best below $70M and destroys value above $290M.²

Academic work points the same direction. Gregory Brown and Lu Yi found that smaller deals generate an average MOIC of 3.88x versus 2.50x for large deals, a 55% premium.¹³ Cambridge Associates data on roughly 1,700 realized U.S. buyout companies (2000 to 2020) shows small-cap deals averaging 2.8x MOIC versus 2.4x for large-cap, with nearly 75% of the strongest revenue growers being small-cap at acquisition.¹⁴

The supply side is the other half of the story. Only about 7.5% of the roughly 200,000 U.S. middle market companies have received any PE investment.⁹ Roughly 75% of U.S. private companies are expected to transition ownership over the next decade, with an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 lower middle market owners pursuing exits annually through 2035.¹⁵

For the full data set on the segment itself, including entry multiples, leverage, fund performance, and exit trends, see our lower middle market private equity statistics guide.

Roll-Up Statistics by Industry

Roll-ups concentrate where fragmentation is extreme and revenue recurs. Insurance brokerage, healthcare, and home services lead the field; car washes, waste, veterinary, and pest control follow the same pattern.

Insurance brokerage: from 12% PE participation to 70%

PE involvement in insurance brokerage deals grew from 12% in 2008 to roughly 70% of all transactions by 2017 to 2022. The U.S. has an estimated 30,000 brokerage and insurance services businesses.¹⁶ Platform brokerage multiples reached 12 to 14x adjusted EBITDA by 2024, while bolt-on multiples rose from 6 to 7x to 8 to 9x.¹⁷

AssuredPartners shows how far the playbook can run. GTCR built the platform from scratch in 2011, completed 112 acquisitions in four years, and sold to Apax Partners in 2015 for approximately $1.7 billion. Apax completed 124 more acquisitions, doubled revenue and EBITDA, and sold back to a GTCR-led consortium in 2019 for $5.1 billion.¹⁸

The final chapter: Arthur J. Gallagher acquired AssuredPartners for $13.45 billion in December 2024, the largest-ever sale of a U.S. insurance broker. Over its 13-year life, AssuredPartners completed 500+ acquisitions.¹⁹

Hub International grew from a $4.4 billion acquisition by Hellman & Friedman in 2013 to a $29 billion valuation in May 2025, roughly 6.6x enterprise value growth over 12 years.²⁰

Healthcare: deal count tripled in a decade

U.S. PE deals in healthcare rose from 443 in 2012 to 1,318 in 2022, with total deal values rising from approximately $45 billion to $112 billion. PE physician practice acquisitions rose 6-fold, from 75 deals in 2012 to 484 in 2021.²¹

Shore Capital Partners, targeting companies with $1M to $10M in EBITDA, has completed 1,300+ deals. Across 14 realized exits as of mid-2023, Shore achieved a median sale return of 5.5x gross MOIC and average gross IRR of 77%, with a worst exit of 3.0x.²²

Waud Capital built Acadia Healthcare from scratch in December 2005, completed 48 acquisitions, took the company public in November 2011, and fully exited by August 2017, building the country’s largest behavioral health provider with 576 facilities across 39 states and the UK.

Single dental offices trade at roughly 5 to 8x EBITDA, while large dental support organizations command 9 to 11x or more.²³ Veterinary practices show a similar spread, with individual clinics typically at 5 to 8x and scaled platforms at 12 to 18x.

Home services: a $657 billion market, 80% founder-led

The U.S. home services market is valued at approximately $657 billion, with 300,000+ small to medium businesses and over 80% remaining founder-led.²⁴

Alpine Investors built Apex Service Partners from scratch in 2019, starting with seed acquisitions of Best Home Services and Frank Gay Services. By October 2023, four years in, Alpine closed a $3.4 billion single-asset continuation fund, one of the largest such transactions on record. The platform spans 107+ brands, $2.2 billion in trailing revenue, and 8,000+ employees across 43 states.²⁵

Technicians at PE-acquired HVAC businesses received a 20% average pay bump in the first year post-acquisition.²⁶

Neighborly (formerly Dwyer Group) passed through five successive PE sponsors from 2010 to 2021. TZP Capital acquired it in 2010 for approximately $150 million. Riverside re-acquired it in 2014, completed 11 add-ons, grew EBITDA 125%, and tripled enterprise value in 3.5 years. Harvest Partners bought it in 2018, then sold to KKR in July 2021 with 28 brands and $3 billion in system-wide sales.²⁷

Car wash, waste, veterinary, pest control

In car washes, only 2 of the top 10 chains were PE-backed in 2016. By 2023, all 10 were. Average sites among the top 10 grew from 51 to 213, yet 75% of car wash companies still operate a single location.²⁸

Leonard Green acquired Mister Car Wash in 2014 for approximately $520 million with roughly 190 locations, grew it to 550+ locations, and took it public in June 2021 at a peak market cap of $6.75 billion. PE-fueled competition then created oversupply, the stock fell 70% from its peak, and Leonard Green took the company private again in February 2026 at $3.1 billion (9x LTM EBITDA).²⁹

In waste services, financial buyers accounted for 55.1% of total deal flow by count as of 2025.³⁰ The sector playbook, in hypothetical form: acquire a regional hauler at 7x EBITDA, complete several bolt-ons at 5 to 6x, lift margins through route density, and exit the combined platform at a premium to the blended entry multiple.

Latticework Capital built American Veterinary Group from a single South Florida clinic in 2015, completed 40+ acquisitions to reach approximately 50 practices and 150 veterinarians across the Southeast, and sold at a confirmed 6.5x MOIC and 82% IRR.³¹

EQT acquired Anticimex (Swedish pest control) in 2012 for approximately $400 million, executed 240+ acquisitions, expanded from 6 countries to 20, grew employees from 1,300 to 7,400, and achieved 19% revenue CAGR and 29% EBITA CAGR. EQT sold to its own longer-duration fund in 2021 at $7.2 billion and called it the “best-ever capital gain for a single EQT fund.”³²

Named Roll-Up Deals with Verified Returns

Specific return figures for PE deals are difficult to verify. The deals below have publicly confirmed or closely estimable metrics from firm disclosures, public filings, or institutional sources. Bolded figures are confirmed; the rest are estimates derived from disclosed deal valuations.

Deal	Sponsor	Sector	MOIC	IRR	Hold Period
Burger King to RBI	3G Capital	QSR	~28x	N/A	2010, ongoing
Anticimex	EQT	Pest control	15 to 20x	N/A	2012 to 2021
Acadia Healthcare	Waud Capital	Behavioral health	~12x	N/A	2005 to 2017
NFP	Madison Dearborn	Insurance brokerage	~10x	N/A	2013 to 2024
Mister Car Wash	Leonard Green	Car wash	~6x	N/A	2014 to 2026
American Vet Group	Latticework Capital	Veterinary	6.5x	82%	2015 to ~2020
Shore Capital (aggregate)	Shore Capital Partners	Healthcare/services	5.5x median	77% avg	Various
AssuredPartners (Rd 1)	GTCR	Insurance brokerage	~4x	N/A	2011 to 2015
USI Insurance	Onex	Insurance brokerage	3.4x	34%	2012 to 2017

Public company benchmarks

TransDigm Group has completed 90+ acquisitions of sole-source aerospace parts manufacturers since 1993. The stock has returned approximately 2,880x the initial equity invested, compounding at roughly 36% annualized over 30+ years, with EBITDA margins above 50%.³³

Constellation Software has delivered approximately 36,000% total shareholder return since its 2006 IPO, roughly 156x, through 1,000+ acquisitions of vertical market software businesses at a minimum 20% to 25% IRR hurdle rate.³⁴

Failure Rates: What Kills Roll-Ups

More than two-thirds of roll-ups fail to create any value for investors, according to Paul Carroll and Chunka Mui in Harvard Business Review’s “Seven Ways to Fail Big.”³⁵ The figure is widely cited but dated (2008), and it draws on general corporate strategy rather than PE-specific deal data.

A more recent practitioner estimate: 60% of PE-backed roll-ups fail to meet projected synergies within two years of acquisition, per Andy Silverman of Parkway Capital, drawing on roughly 250 independent sponsor deals reviewed per year.³⁶

Academic research complicates the return picture too. Acharya, Hahn, and Kehoe found that organic PE deals produce an average IRR of 48.5% with 15.8% alpha, while acquisitive deals produce 28.6% IRR with only 3.4% alpha, on a sample of 66 large UK deals.³⁷ Organic deals also exited faster, 3.3 years versus 4.5. Much of the raw roll-up return in that sample traced to debt and sector exposure rather than operational improvement.

The cautionary tales: Envision Healthcare filed for bankruptcy under KKR after an aggressive physician staffing roll-up. Synova Capital’s Clyde Munro, a 65-practice Scottish dental roll-up, entered liquidation in 2025. The pattern repeats: overpaying at entry, overleveraging the platform, or underinvesting in integration.

The BCG data says the same thing from the other direction. Deals with more than 2 add-ons returned 19.9% IRR, below standalone buyouts at 23.1%.² Integration capacity, not deal sourcing, is the binding constraint.

Regulation is the newer risk. More than 50% of PE add-on acquisitions fall below the HSR Act reporting threshold, meaning most roll-up deals escape antitrust review entirely,³⁸ and in May 2024 the FTC and DOJ jointly launched a public inquiry into serial acquisitions and roll-up strategies.³⁹

How Add-On Acquisitions Are Financed

For sub-$10M add-on deals, the average capital stack in 2024 was 66.7% senior debt, 19.6% equity, and 13.7% subordinated debt. For platform acquisitions in the same size range, it flips: 31.8% senior debt and 61.4% equity. Add-ons are financed largely through the platform’s existing credit facility, requiring far less incremental equity from the sponsor.⁴⁰

Why this matters, in hypothetical terms: If a platform is acquired with 60% equity and an add-on is financed with only 20% equity, the buyer is acquiring incremental EBITDA with far less capital at risk. A $5M EBITDA add-on at 4x, financed 80% with debt, requires $4M in equity. If the combined platform later commands 10x, that $5M of EBITDA is worth $50M against the $4M of incremental equity deployed. The leverage cuts both ways; the same structure magnifies losses when integration fails.

Average pro forma debt for U.S. LBOs ran 5.2x EBITDA in 2024, up from a 13-year low of 4.9x in 2023, and 84% of 2024 LBOs were funded with private credit, up from 65% in 2021.⁴¹

One counterintuitive 2024 data point: add-ons with enterprise value between $1M and $10M averaged 5.7x EBITDA, while platforms in the same size range averaged 4.5x. Add-ons commanded a premium over platforms, an inversion of the classic assumption, and roughly 75% of sub-$10M deals were add-ons. Demand for bolt-on targets at the micro-deal level is bidding away part of the arbitrage.⁴⁰

How Investors Access Roll-Up Deals

Most of the data above describes institutional PE. For individual accredited investors, the practical access points to roll-up strategies are narrower, and each carries different tradeoffs on minimums, selection, and diversification.

Fund commitments. A blind-pool LMM fund gives diversified exposure across 10 to 20 portfolio companies, many running buy-and-build playbooks. Minimums typically run $1M or more, capital locks up for a decade, and the LP has no say in which roll-up theses the fund pursues. Manager selection carries the outcome, and the best small funds are often closed or institutionally gated.

Deal-by-deal co-investment. The alternative is selecting individual transactions. Most lower middle market roll-ups are led by independent sponsors, dealmakers who acquire one company at a time and raise equity per deal rather than from a fund. The platform sizes involved, typically $1M to $7M in EBITDA and $5M to $30M in enterprise value, sit in the range where the BCG data shows buy-and-build returns concentrate.

CapitalPad is a private equity co-investment group that lets accredited investors back these deals individually. Sponsors raise $1M to $2.5M in equity per independent sponsor deal ($300K to $2M for self-funded search deals), and investors participate from $25K per deal, with all co-investors in a deal pooled into a single SPV. Fewer than 5% of inbound deals advance to investors, roughly one per month, drawn from a base of more than 1,400 approved accredited investors plus family offices and funds.

The fee structure differs from a traditional fund. Sponsors pay nothing at any stage. Investors pay a one-time 1.5% administration fee per investment and 20% carried interest subject to a 100% return-of-capital hurdle, with no annual management fee.

Deal-by-deal selection matters for roll-up investing specifically because the dispersion is wide. The data above shows deals with 1 to 2 add-ons outperforming deals with 3 or more by 15+ IRR points, and sub-$70M platforms outperforming large ones by 40 points. An investor reviewing individual deals can apply those filters; a blind-pool LP cannot.

The tradeoffs are real and worth stating plainly. These are illiquid positions in single companies, with a 3 to 7 year target hold, no secondary market, and the majority of any potential return typically realized only at exit. Roll-up theses can fail in integration even when the entry math looks clean, and a concentrated deal-by-deal portfolio carries more single-deal risk than a diversified fund. This structure fits investors who want to underwrite individual deals and can leave capital untouched for years; it is a poor fit for anyone who may need liquidity before an exit.

What This Data Tells Investors

The strategy is the market now. At 76% of deal count and 80%+ of lower middle market activity, buy-and-build is no longer a differentiated thesis. It is the default. The differentiation has moved inside the strategy, to platform size, add-on pacing, and integration capacity.

Returns concentrate in restraint. Every credible dataset points the same direction: small platforms beat large ones, 1 to 2 add-ons beat 5, sector-deepening beats diversifying, and experienced operators beat first-timers by 9+ IRR points. The winners in the verified-returns table earned their multiples by integrating well, not by acquiring fast.

The arbitrage is narrowing at the bottom. Sub-$10M add-ons now price above same-size platforms, an inversion that did not exist a decade ago, while regulatory attention on serial acquisitions is rising. The entry-multiple gap that powers the model still exists, but it is no longer free money. Operators who win from here will do it through integration and organic growth on top of the arbitrage, not the arbitrage alone.

Sources & References

1. PitchBook Q2 2025 U.S. PE data, reported by Cherry Bekaert, “Private Equity Mid-Year Trends in 2025.” Source
2. BCG & HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, “The Power of Buy and Build” (2016). Source (PDF)
3. Bain & Company, “Private Equity Outlook,” Global Private Equity Report 2023. Source
4. PitchBook bolt-on data, reported by NEPC, Quarterly Private Markets Report Q4 2025. Source
5. Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report 2025. Source
6. Bain & Company, “Building a Stronger Buy-and-Build,” Global Private Equity Report 2024. Source
7. PwC, “Unlocking Value with Buy-and-Build Strategies in the DACH Private Equity Market” (March 2025). Gainpro data. Source (PDF)
8. McKinsey & Company, “Private Equity: Clearer View, Tougher Terrain,” Global Private Markets Report 2026. Source
9. National Center for the Middle Market, “Private Equity in the Middle Market” 2025 Special Report; employment effects per Davis, Haltiwanger et al., American Economic Review (2014). Source (PDF)
10. PitchBook, “Middle-Market Buyout Funds Dominate Fundraising” (Q1 2023). Source
11. Yale School of Management, “On the Nature of Entry Multiples” (2025). Source (PDF)
12. PitchBook data, reported by Cherry Bekaert, “Private Equity Report: 2024 Trends & 2025 Outlook.” Source
13. Gregory W. Brown and Lu Yi, “How Do Private Equity Firms Create Value?” Source (PDF)
14. Cambridge Associates, “US Private Equity Looking Back, Looking Forward: Ten Years of CA Operating Metrics” (2024). Source
15. Ninepoint Partners, “A Strategic Case for Investing in U.S. Lower Middle Market Private Equity” (2024). Source (PDF)
16. KPMG, “Insurance Brokerage M&A” (2018). Source (PDF)
17. MarshBerry, “How Much Higher Can Insurance M&A Valuations Rise?” (2024). Source
18. Apax Partners, “Apax VIII Sells Its Stake in AssuredPartners to GTCR” (2019). Source
19. GTCR, “GTCR Announces Sale of AssuredPartners to Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. for $13.45 Billion” (December 2024). Source
20. Hub International, “$29 Billion Valuation” press release (May 2025). Source
21. OECD, “Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups,” DAF/COMP(2023)13. Source (PDF)
22. Harvard Business School, “Shore Capital Partners: The Next Ten Years,” Case 424-036 (2024). Source
23. FOCUS Investment Banking, “Dental Practice EBITDA Multiples” (2026). Source
24. Philip A. Saunders Advisory, “The Rising Tide of Private Equity Investment in Home Services” (2024). Source
25. Alpine Investors / Business Wire, “$3.4 Billion Single-Asset Continuation Transaction” (October 2023). Source
26. Wall Street Journal reporting (October 2024), via American Investment Council. Source
27. Franchise Times, “KKR Makes Winning Bid for Home-Services Franchisor Neighborly” (2021). Source
28. CarWash.com, “Where Is Private Equity Heading?” (2023). Source
29. PitchBook, “Mister Car Wash Is Once More in Private Hands” (2026); Yahoo Finance (2026). Source
30. Capstone Partners, “Waste & Recycling M&A Update” (August 2025). Source
31. Latticework Capital Management, “Latticework Sells American Veterinary Group.” Source
32. EQT Group, “How EQT Took Anticimex from Nordic Player to Global Pest Control Giant”; PE Insights (2021). Source
33. Bristlemoon Research, “TransDigm: The King of Aerospace Private Equity”; The Investor’s Podcast intrinsic value analysis. Source
34. Cantech Letter, “Constellation Software Has Delivered a 36,000% Return Since Its IPO” (2025). Source
35. Paul Carroll and Chunka Mui, “Seven Ways to Fail Big,” Harvard Business Review (September 2008). Source
36. Opus Connect, “Roll-Up or Roll-Over? A Seasoned Leader’s Insights” (2024). Source
37. Acharya, Hahn & Kehoe, “Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity,” Review of Finance (2013). Source
38. American Economic Liberties Project, “The Roll-Up Economy” (December 2022). PitchBook-derived data. Source (PDF)
39. Federal Trade Commission, “FTC and DOJ Seek Info on Serial Acquisitions, Roll-Up Strategies” (May 2024). Source
40. GF Data, reported by Middle Market Growth (ACG), “Small Deals Big Factor in Middle-Market Private Equity in 2024” (January 2025). Source
41. LCD (Leveraged Commentary & Data), reported by PitchBook, “LBO Update” (2025). Source